In transitional justice, the impulse to do more is often driven by legitimate demands: more truth, more accountability, more inclusion. Yet, systems designed to address mass atrocity are not built to do everything, but what is possible. When expansion exceeds institutional capacities, the result may not be more justice—but less.

This tension came sharply into focus in Colombia following a constitutional challenge brought against a ruling that could broaden the jurisdiction and mandate of the national Peace Tribunal, by assigning new tasks to certain judges within the court. While the rationale for this decision is legitimate, and linked to guaranteeing the rights of all victims, this interpretation revealed other risks. In essence, this was a decision about the boundaries, viability, and internal logic of Colombia’s transitional justice system; and the validity of the 2016 Peace Agreement.

From legal question to systemic dilemma

After receiving this legal challenge, the Court carried out extensive consultations with top global and national experts on the implications of this decision. Essentially, the debate evolved beyond doctrinal interpretation into a broader reflection on how transitional justice systems function under constraint.

In this process, and as one of the most prestigious expert organizations in Colombia, IFIT engaged in a sustained analytical effort, drawing on its global Law and Peace Practice Group and its Brain Trust for the Colombian Transition to examine the issue from comparative, legal, and policy perspectives. This work resulted in two key contributions for the Court: a detailed written intervention submitted to the Court in June 2025, and a subsequent oral intervention during a public hearing in October 2025.

Across both moments, IFIT advanced a position that stood out in the debate: rather than focusing exclusively on the legality of the measure, it examined its practical and institutional consequences.

A system built on selectivity

At the core of IFIT’s argument was a simple but often overlooked premise: the Peace Tribunal was designed to operate through selectivity and prioritisation. Its ability to deliver truth and accountability depends precisely on its capacity to limit the number of cases and individuals it processes. This model enables the system to concentrate on those most responsible while providing legal certainty to thousands of others. Selectivity is not a compromise of justice, but a condition for its realisation in contexts of mass violence.

Expanding the system’s scope—particularly to include new categories of actors—risks destabilising this equilibrium. In a jurisdiction already operating under significant time and resource constraints, expansion is not merely additive; it alters the premises of the entire system.

Beyond legality: the risks of overextension

IFIT’s intervention highlighted three interrelated practical risks. First, institutional overload: key bodies within the JEP already face significant backlogs, and expanding their functions would likely delay the prosecution and sanctioning of those most responsible. 

Second, distortions regarding due process and proportionality may arise. Individuals who were not initially selected—and therefore never had the procedural opportunity to acknowledge responsibility—could end up facing harsher sanctions than those who, despite being among the most responsible, accessed more favorable sanctions after accepting responsibility in a timely manner.

Third, fragmentation of the broader system: overburdening the judicial component risks undermining the integrated balance of Colombia’s transitional justice architecture, which is enshrined in the broader 2016 Peace Agreement.

Taken together, these concerns point to a broader conclusion: expanding jurisdiction without regard to institutional design can ultimately weaken, rather than strengthen, transitional justice and the peace process in place.

An intervention that reframed the debate

In its intervention, IFIT introduced a pragmatic and system-oriented lens, foregrounding feasibility, sequencing, and institutional capacity.

Elements of this reasoning were reflected in the Court’s subsequent decision. In particular, the idea that transitional justice systems guarantee the rights of victims only if they are able to fulfil their mandate—and not when they expand beyond it—echoed a central line of IFIT’s analysis.

A broader lesson: discipline as a condition of justice, Colombia as an example

The Colombian case underscores a structural dilemma that extends far beyond this specific decision. There is a persistent temptation to expand justice in response to unresolved harms or political pressure. Yet without careful attention to design, such expansions can erode coherence, delay outcomes, and ultimately weaken trust.

In this sense, restraint is not a retreat from justice, but a form of institutional discipline that enables justice to be delivered. This is particularly salient in Colombia, where the JEP remains the most ambitious transitional justice experiment globally. 

The decision by the Constitutional Court will therefore resonate beyond the country. It will signal whether transitional justice systems can preserve their internal logic under pressure—or whether they risk being too ambitious in ways that compromise their effectiveness. 

The lesson is clear: in transitional justice, success is not determined by how much a system attempts to do, but by whether it can deliver on what it was designed to do.